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Briefing Paper 2 
SCOTTISH BUS SERVICES AMD THE 'BUSES' WHITE PAPER 
Tom Hart 
U n i v e r s i t y o f Glasgow 
The White Paper on 'Buses' (Cmnd 9300; 
1984) i s undoubtedly a revolutionary 
document. The overriding theme i s that, 
while the rise in car ownership and other 
shifts in l i festyle have created problems 
for the s e c t o r , the major cu r r en t 
d i f f i c u l t i e s derive from lax growth of 
subsidies to an industry with a seriously 
defective s t ruc ture . A r i s e in revenue 
support from £10m in 1972 to £520m in 1982 
(£38m being in Scotland) has fa i led to 
reverse the decline in patronage and has 
come into sharp conflict with government's 
desire to cut public spending. The 
budgeted revenue support of English local 
authorities for buses in 1984/85 is s t i l l 
83? above government provision. The 
S c o t t i s h excess i s lower , but s t i l l 
s igni f icant , a t 34?. The White Paper 
i n s i s t s tha t these spending levels must 
be reduced yet goes on to argue that, in a 
fully competitive environment, spending 
cuts will be compatible with a reversal of 
public transport's declining share of the 
t ravel market. Since spending would be 
c o n c e n t r a t e d on s p e c i f i c s o c i a l 
objectives, the government's view i s that 
increased competition need not mean any 
increase in social deprivation. The 
urgency for s t ruc tu ra l change in the 
industry i s s tressed and l eg i s l a t i on i s 
anticipated in the 1984/85 parliamentary 
session. 
The White Paper proposed to extend the 
deregulation introduced in the Transport 
Act, 1980. This Act made three main 
changes - abolition of the requirement for 
express buses (operating over 30 miles 
between stops) to have route licences, the 
removal from the Traffic Commissioners of 
controls over fares (except for cer ta in 
reserve powers) and the introduction by 
the Commissioners of a presumption in 
favour of new services s t i l l coming within 
the regulatory framework. The further 
proposals are now being made are:-
1) t o t a l abol i t ion of route l icensing for 
scheduled bus s e r v i c e (bu t w i t h 
strengthened quality and safety controls 
to prevent abuses of deregulation) 
2) abolition of general operating subsidies 
(at present widely used by passenger 
t r a n s p o r t e x e c u t i v e s (PTEs) and 
municipal bus operators) 
3) conversion of PTE and municipal bus 
operators into separate companies owned 
by the relevant local au thor i t i es but 
with the option to pr iva t i se if such 
authorities so wish 
4) concession fare support to be available 
to a l l operators and to be modified to 
prevent disguised subsidy to general 
costs 
5) introduction of competitive tendering 
for essential, but non-viable, services 
6) a p p l i c a t i o n of R e s t r i c t i v e Trade 
Pract ices Act, 1976, to the bus sector 
(involving the monitoring of agreements 
between operators in the i n t e r e s t s of 
competition) 
7) provision to be made for separate fares 
on taxis and for the removal of quantity 
controls on taxis 
8) a l l bus ope ra to r s to have equal 
opportunities for access to terminals 
9) the statutory duty of local authorities 
to co-ordinate services to be replaced 
by a duty (applying to Regional and 
Islands Councils in Scotland) 'to secure 
t h e e f f i c i e n t p r o v i s i o n of such 
transport services as necessary but not 
provided by a free market'. 
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In t o t a l , t h i s represents a substant ial 
shift towards a deregulated, competitive 
market and i t i s recognised that this will 
involve elimination - over time - of the 
extensive cross-subsidies which have been 
the norm since 1930. 
Chapter 7 of the White Paper deals with 
Scotland. In most respects , i t adopts 
the proposals made for England and Wales 
but there i s one important exception. 
South of the border, the White Paper makes 
much use of the argument that effective 
competition will depend on breaking down 
exist ing large operators into smaller 
u n i t s and t h e r e i s a l so a d i s t i n c t 
preference for p r i v a t i s a t i o n . Firm 
proposals are put forward to spli t up and 
pr ivat i se the National Bus Company. In 
the Scottish chapter, however, attention 
is drawn to the relative efficiency of the 
Scottish Bus Group (SBG). No proposals 
are made ei ther to s p l i t up or pr iva t i se 
t h i s Group though, as part of the new 
system for competitive tendering, i t would 
be expected to tender for loss-making 
rou tes r a the r than be the prefer red 
recipient for subsidy. 
Anticipating reactions that transformation 
of a well-established system of regulation 
would lead to economic destabilisation and 
soc i a l dep r iva t ion , the White Paper 
contains three Annexes which seek to 
jus t i fy the proposed changes. The most 
i n t e r e s t i n g m a t e r i a l i s in Annex 2, 
prepared by Department of Transport 
economists assisted by three external 
advisers - Professor M Beesley, Dr S 
Glaister and Mr M Buchanan. 
At ten t ion i s r i g h t l y drawn to the 
d i f f i cu l t i e s of forecasting the dynamic 
impacts of structural change, not least in 
re la t ion to labour agreements and to the 
more urbanised areas where the potential 
for change i s greates t . Despite i t s 
messianic market approach and the 
ferocity of some of the comments opposing 
the White Paper, s t ructura l changes take 
time to have fu l l effect and, so far as 
Scotland i s concerned, the White Paper 
envisages some increase in competition 
between the SBG and the four Regional 
Council bus undertakings (at present based 
on Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee and 
Aberdeen) rather than any spectacular, and 
unsettling, growth of competition from the 
private sector. 
The Scope for Cost Reductions and Structural 
Change 
The White Paper carries conviction when i t 
argues that exist ing revenue support has 
given very variable results which cannot be 
explained away by differences in the areas 
served. This echoes the findings of Hart 
and Thomson (1981) for the Scottish Consumer 
Council . Given t h a t bus support in 
Aberdeen in 1982/83 was £2 per head of 
population compared to over £15 in Glasgow 
(with Aberdeen, if anything, having the 
better pattern of fares and services), i t i s 
hard to resist the White Paper's conclusion 
t h a t , by applying bes t p r a c t i c e s more 
generally, some reduction in f inancial 
support could be achieved without any net 
inconvenience to the travelling public. A 
s imilar ly unfavourable contrast i s drawn 
between Strathclyde PTE's bus costs and the 
much lower c o s t s of Central SMT, the 
subsidiary of SBG serving the most urbanised 
part of the SBG area and therefore likely to 
have costs above the SBG norm. 
Unless operators such as the Strathclyde PTE 
are able to improve the i r efficiency, the 
requirements of the White Paper are likely 
to see further contraction of SPTE services 
in favour of SBG expansion. Something 
s imilar may happen around Dundee but both 
Aberdeen and Edinburgh would appear to be 
be t te r placed to susta in , or even expand, 
their level of bus operations. As regards 
private bus companies, some shift away from 
SBT i s to be expected in rural areas but 
SBG, with i t s super io r resources and 
comparatively high level of efficiency, 
ought to be well placed to respond to the 
threa t of encroachment on busier t r a f f i c 
corr idors . This would s t i l l leave some 
scope for the further expansion of private 
operators (as has already happened since 
1980) but SBG would remain the dominant 
operator. In employment terms, of course, 
these changes represent an increased threat 
to the Strathclyde PTE but th i s i s a threa t 
which already e x i s t s in the Regional 
Council's own effor ts to achieve be t te r 
value from i t s spending on public transport. 
The Elimination of Cross-subsidy 
Another important issue arising from the 
White Paper i s c ross - subs idy and the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of ending t h i s under 
deregulation. One of the main purposes of 
regulation since the 1930s has been to allow 
cross-subsidy both between routes and within 
routes. Such cross-subsidy has come under 
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powerful at tack on economic and social 
grounds. The economic effect of cross-
subsidy i s to ' tax ' prof i table services, 
hindering the i r expansion and weakening 
public t ranspor t ' s share of the t ravel 
market. Socially, cross-subsidy has also 
harmed many lower income users who would 
b e n e f i t from f a r e r educ t i ons and/or 
service improvements on profitable routes 
while, additionally, cross-subsidy has had 
the arbitrary effect of taxing some lower 
income earners (the main users of bus 
services) to provide services for other 
low income earners and, in some cases, for 
middling to higher income bus users. The 
actual impact of cross-subsidy in relation 
to economic and equitable objectives has 
been under - researched but the White 
Paper's conclusion tha t bet ter r e su l t s 
would be achieved i f d i r e c t subsidy 
replaced cross-subsidy is substantiated. 
What i s less convincing i s the view that, 
even after the elimination of cross-
subsidy and the reduc t ion of d i r e c t 
aggregate support, social provision will 
be at l e a s t as good as now. The theory 
behind th i s view i s tha t the scope for 
cross-subsidy can be more than compensated 
by a switch of a greater share of reduced 
direct funding from city services to other 
services . Whether such a switch i s 
feasible in Scotland i s doubtful for two 
reasons. F i r s t l y , within the SBG area, 
cross-subsidy s t i l l accounts for 75% of 
a l l subsidy. At l eas t £15m a year of 
d i r e c t support would be requ i red to 
replace i t . Secondly, in admitting that 
the 'excess' on public t ransport revenue 
support i s much l e s s in Scotland than in 
England, government i s also admitting that 
i t would be more d i f f i cu l t to find the 
'painless ' savings needed to finance the 
replacement of cross-subsidy without 
increases in the total budget. A hint i s 
dropped tha t one way out of t h i s dilemma 
would be for Strathclyde to accelerate 
savings in i t s substantial expenditure on 
support for local r a i l services. I t i s 
a l so pointed out t h a t compe t i t i ve 
tendering and fu l l e r use of minibuses, 
school buses and tax i s could prevent 
deprivation without requiring replacement 
of the e n t i r e £15m a year of c r o s s -
subsidies with direct support. 
The White Paper does concede that the 
situation will require careful monitoring. 
I t admits tha t social losses may exceed 
social gains and indicates that the client 
group means of assessing Rate Support 
Grant wi l l be used to a s s i s t Regional 
Councils fac ing funding problems for 
s o c i a l bus f a c i l i t i e s as a r e s u l t of 
deregulation. Given the present financial 
pressures on local au thor i t i e s , regulated 
cross-subsidy remains for them an attractive 
means of sustaining des i rable , but l o s s -
making, bus services without affecting the 
r a t e b u r d e n y e t t h e s e f i n a n c i a l 
circumstances have diverted a t tent ion away 
from the real argument over the economic and 
social disadvantages of cross-subsidy. The 
White Paper will ensure that this argument 
i s no longer ignored. 
Deregulation, Co-ordination and Reliability 
The l a s t type of assessment made in the 
White Paper concerns the f ea r s t h a t 
d e r e g u l a t i o n may l ead to s e r v i c e 
fragmentation, 'cowboy' operations, poorer 
co-ordination and reduced r e l i a b i l i t y . 
Some trend in this direction is accepted as 
inevitable to secure the greater benefits of 
a competitive and innovative environment but 
i t i s emphasised that 'market' pressures 
wi l l promote, co-ordination where i t i s 
commercially a t t r a c t i ve . In the i r own 
in t e r e s t , competing operators would also 
have a s t rong i ncen t i ve to provide 
convenient and reliable services. Chronic 
a b u s e s would be p r e v e n t e d by the 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of q u a l i t y c o n t r o l s . 
Licences to operate (as distinct from route 
licences) would s t i l l be required with 
offending operators l i ab l e to the sanction 
of loss of l icence. The White Paper also 
proposes that the Licensing Authority should 
have new reserve powers to impose conditions 
on rou t e s and s topping p laces eg in 
congested urban areas. Routes and timings 
of a l l local bus services will s t i l l have to 
be regis tered and adequate notice given of 
withdrawal. Final ly, open access to bus 
t e r m i n a l s i s proposed to encourage 
interchange and to prevent any one operator 
excluding rivals. 
Depending on how these p rov i s ions are 
in terpre ted , they could s t i l l amount to a 
substant ia l - though different - system of 
regulation. Further consultation i s also 
promised on the details of moves towards the 
'market ' - p a r t i c u l a r l y on systems of 
tendering, the means of ensuring that a l l 
o p e r a t o r s can p a r t i c i p a t e in l o c a l 
concessionary fare schemes, provisions for 
temporary Regional Council funding in cases 
of insolvency and on adjustment of the taxi 
market. This leaves considerable scope for 
modification of the actual proposals and, 
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cynically, one has to bear in mind tha t 
the four-year period of t r a n s i t i o n a l 
financing outlined for the new system 
would extend well beyond the next General 
Election. 
I t would be regrettable if the White Paper 
led to unnecessary i n s t a b i l i t y by 
provoking confrontation between a right-
wing rush to push through market-oriented 
leg i s la t ion and an equally strong l e f t -
wing determination to revert to a much 
more regulated framework with a high 
degree of public ownership. Further 
discussion i s needed to ensure that the 
White Paper l eads to an acceptable 
legislative framework, as free as possible 
from the upsets of abrupt alteration. 
The Lack of a Systematic 'Market' Approach 
The White Paper has sensible things to say 
about the need to shif t towards bet ter 
practices to meet both economic and social 
objectives. I t i s r ight ly c r i t i c a l of 
general operating support and of cross-
subsidy but i t i s preoccupied with cuts in 
public spending rather than with finding 
an overall structure to increase the total 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t r a n s p o r t . I t 
exaggerates them in a peculiarly limited 
way. By fa i l ing to consider whether 
'market ' concepts are applied evenly 
across transport , i t i s in danger of 
applying more rigorous standards to public 
passenger transport than to cars. John 
Hibbs (1982) has argued t h a t with 
e f f e c t i v e road p r i c ing and t r a f f i c 
management, the 'economic' bus sector 
would be even larger than i t appears to be 
under present conditions. An effective 
market therefore requires either economic 
subsidies related to public transport use 
(notably in urban areas) or a reduction in 
the requirement for such subsidy through 
road p r i c ing and t r a f f i c management 
measures. The White Paper ignores t h i s 
issue and, in applying 'market' techniques 
to social subsidy, is curiously reluctant 
to consider options under which general 
operating de f i c i t s would be replaced by 
d i r e c t spending in support of non-
commercial, but desirable, objectives. 
The emphasis i s on cuts in to ta l public 
support rather than on the possibility of 
internalising social considerations within 
the 'market' through new types of direct 
payment in support of policy objectives. 
One such payment i s recognised - that for 
social concession fares - but this concept 
ought to have been taken further. 
Provided that payments to cover deficits are 
avoided, there is considerable scope for the 
use of financial techniques to promote a 
more effective transport market geared to 
social and economic needs. The White Paper 
does acknowledge the central government 
support given to local buses in the form of 
the rebate of Fuel Duty but i t makes no 
effort to explore the more dynamic use of 
such a device. An increase in the value of 
t h i s support (currently worth almost £100 
million a year) could be a means both of 
stimulating expansion and of reducing the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s of compe t i t ive 
tendering and the negotiation of concession 
far support. At the local authority level, 
greater f inancial resources could also be 
used to secure greater co-ordination than 
would otherwise occur within a deregulated 
system. Clearly, the desire for spending 
cuts has inhibited invest igat ion of such 
options, yet in many other countries, there 
has been a willingness to spend more heavily 
on public transport and to replace regulated 
cross-subsidy (which did have a t t r ac t ions 
under conditions of rapid public transport 
expansion and low car ownership) with a new 
variant of cross-subsidy from motor taxation 
revenues to public transport. 
The White Paper seems unable to appreciate 
the common continental European and North 
American atitude that affluent societies may 
choose to give much more substantial support 
to public transport than the norm set by the 
Bri t ish government. Some of t h i s support 
has been misused, Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez 
(1981), but, on the whole, i t has produced 
benefits for users and for the environment 
which would not have been attainable under 
alternative policies. 
The Merits of Regulation 
The very complexity of environmental , 
transport and land use issues place l i m i t s 
on the extent to which a 'market' approach 
to transport can be successfully adopted. 
Greater use of market incentives does have 
a t t r a c t i o n s for c o n t r o l l i n g c o s t s and 
encouraging change but the 'market' needs to 
exis t within an appropriate framework of 
regulation. The White Paper favours a loose 
reign of regulation, v i r tua l ly confined to 
f inancial ru les , quali ty and safety. I t 
envisages much more flexible operation with 
g r ea t e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n in f a r e s and 
services emerging from competition. I t 
recognises that 'systems of large-scale 
planned public service networks can indeed 
p r o v i d e h i g h - q u a l i t y s e r v i c e s and 
connections' but i t doubts whether the 
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benefits of such networks are great enough 
t o j u s t i f y t he c o s t s . No d i r e c t 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s conclusion i s made 
and, in highlighting the de s i r ab i l i t y of 
more va r ied s e r v i c e s and f a r e s with 
multiple operators, the White Paper does 
not give enough attention to the positive 
merits of planned t ransport and land use 
developments supported by integrated 
marketing. Much of the progress already 
made in reversing the decline in urban 
public t ransport and in improving the 
environment has been made through the 
introduction of Travelcard tickets (bought 
before use and with zonal ava i l ab i l i ty ) 
associated with well planned bus/rail co-
ordination, se lec t ive traffic management 
and r educ t ions in inner c i t y road 
building. Such 'planned' approaches tend 
to reduce total resource and social costs 
and also f a c i l i t a t e successful overall 
marketing with a view to increasing public 
transport's share of the market, something 
which i s d i f f i c u l t under a fragmented, 
competitive approach with l i t t l e through 
ticketing and poor publicity for the total 
system. 
There is a continuing case for regulation 
which goes beyond mere qual i ty controls , 
especially in larger urban areas and in 
highly marginal rural areas and corridors 
where u n r e s t r i c t e d competition could 
create dangerous i n s t a b i l i t y . Hibbs 
himself, though a pro-market writer, has 
argued strongly in favour of Conurbation 
Transport Authori t ies to in tegra te a l l 
modes into the same policy framework. In 
Strathclyde, the most urgent reform is for 
the Regional Council t o develop an 
integrated approach to i t s roads, traffic 
management and public t ransport pol ic ies 
rather than to be forced to adopt new 
s t r u c t u r e s which could des t roy the 
advantages beginning to come from the 
extensive use of Travelcards and improved 
publ ic i ty . The 'market1 and ' regulat ion ' 
must co-exis t . The problem i s not how 
best to dismantle regulation but how best 
to marry the market with restructured 
r egu la to ry and f i n a n c i a l procedures. 
(Hart, 1983). 
Conclusions 
To sum up, the White Paper r e q u i r e s 
significant modification before i t passes 
into law. In i t s Scott ish aspects, i t i s 
more wil l ing to see network advantages 
(e.g. in sustaining SBG as a unity) and more 
cau t ious about p r i v a t i s a t i o n than for 
England and Wales. Other matters which 
merit careful consideration and modification 
include:-
a) a change of emphasis from spending cuts 
to spending res t ructure (with Regional 
Councils being required to el iminate 
general de f i c i t s but simultaneously 
encouraged to inc rease spending in 
direct support of policy objectives) 
b) increased central government support 
related to bus use and paid d i rec t to 
operators (as in the present Fuel Rebate 
for local buses) 
c) a l locat ion of part of the proceeds of 
motor t a x a t i o n for s u s t a i n i n g and 
improving public transport 
d) strengthened regulatory powers over the 
t o t a l t ransport system in the larger 
urban areas and in rura l zones where 
unrestricted competition would be likely 
t o have a s e v e r e , d e s t a b l i s i n g 
influence. 
More fundamentally, the government ought to 
publish, and review regular ly , a Transport 
White Paper. No White Paper on Transport 
Policy has appeared since 1977 and a White 
Paper dealing only with buses i s not an 
adequate substitute for an overall review of 
the transport framework in re la t ion to 
policy objectives and changing needs. 
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